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International Joint Ventures (IJVs) are increasingly regarded as an important means of 
international expansion.  A large body of literature has investigated the key 
characteristics of IJVs, however most of the research has been exploratory rather than 
confirmatory.  This paper has developed a model to investigate (i) the effect of parent 
partner motive divergence and parent partner resource contributions to IJVs on parent 
partner management control systems (MCS) choices, (ii) the impact of parent partner 
resource contributions to IJVs on parent partner motive divergence and (iii) the 
impact of parent partner motive divergence and parent partner management control 
system choices on IJV performance.  The data for this paper was gathered from a 
cross sectional survey questionnaire which collected data from Australian based 
parent partners of IJVs operating abroad.  The results provide confirmatory evidence 
that motive divergence has a significant impact on performance and some impact on 
parent partner management control system choices.  Resource contributions made by 
parent partners to IJVs was also found to have a significant impact on parent partner 
MCS choices and motive divergence.  These findings provide confirmatory evidence 
of exploratory results and sound suggestions to the world of practice. 
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International Joint Ventures (IJVs) are frequently used as a key strategic 
mechanism for companies to expand globally.  The increase in the use of IJVs can be 
attributed to companies seeking to capitalise on growth in global markets (Pothukuchi, 
Damanpour, Choi, Chen and Park, 2002), particularly those situated in developing 
economies such as China and India (Calantone and Zhao, 2000).  In addition the 
growing use of IJVs as a method of international expansion is frequently the result of 
companies wishing to share risk in highly uncertain environments and gather the 
significant resources needed when entering new markets (Bamford, Ernst and Fubini, 
2004). 
Parent partners entering into IJVs have a wide range of motives or objectives 
they wish to achieve.  The objectives of one parent partner may be similar or 
complementary to those of other parent partner(s) resulting in a clear consensus 
among the partners as to the central objectives to be achieved by the IJV or may be 
different and divergent.  Divergent motives between parent partners are often 
mentioned in the extant literature.  Luo, Shenkar & Nyaw (2001) refer to the term as 
goal incongruity, Kamminga & Meer-Kooistra (2006) investigated joint ventures 
where partner have different interests and Mohr (2006) found that multiple partners of 
a IJV judge the success and performance differently, according to their individual 
interests.  In this paper we investigate the effect of motive divergence on parent 
partner MCS choices and IJV performance, and the effect of parent partner resource 
contributions on motive divergence and MCS choices.  
 
Research Questions and Motivation 
 
The presence of motive divergence could have significant consequences for 
IJV performance (Ding, 1997; Luo and Park, 2003) and further understanding of the 
implications of motive divergence between parent partners could provide key 
evidence as to the reason behind it (Nielsen, 2007).  It is also critical IJV parents 
understand whether MCS can be utilised to reduce the negative effects of motive 
divergence and yield higher performance.  The exercise of MCS by a parent partner 
over an IJV is frequently argued to be essential to improving performance.  In the 
context of IJVs, MCS can be classified according to the dimensions of focus, extent, 
and mechanisms of control (Geringer and Herbert, 1989).  Investigation of the impact 
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of MCS choices by parent partners will provide guidance as to the best course of 
action to reduce to the negative impact motive divergence may have on performance.  
Contribution of critical resources to the IJV by one parent partner has the 
potential to lead to opportunistic behaviour by another partner who may exploit 
resource contributed for their own benefit.  This raises the possibility that critical 
resource contribution by one partner could lead to higher levels of motive divergence 
stemming from opportunistically based motives of the other parent partner(s).  This 
raises the question of whether MCS can be used to limit possible opportunistic 
behaviour where high levels of critical resources are contributed to the IJV entity.  
This is particularly important in regions such as China, where contracts over resource 
contributions are an ineffective mechanism to guard against opportunistic learning 
behaviour by a parent partner (Calantone & Zhao, 2000). 
The objectives of this paper are to investigate (i) the relationship between 
motive divergence and IJV performance, (ii) whether the critical resource contribution 
impacts on the level of motive divergence, (iii) whether parent partner motive 
divergence and parent partner critical resource contributions affect the choice of MCS 
exercised by IJV partners and (iv) the effect of parent partner MCS choices on 
performance.  These factors will be investigated from the perspective of foreign IJV 
partners originating from advanced industrialised economies.  This is of relevance 
given that IJVs are increasingly being regarded as a means of international expansion, 
particularly to developing economies.  In addition limited research on these issues is 
available in extant literature.  The extant research is largely exploratory and based on 
case studies.  Si and Bruton (2005) and Luo and Park (2003) provide confirmatory 
evidence on the negative performance consequences of divergent motives, however 
these findings are focused on Chinese based IJVs. 
Parent partners’ use of MCS is frequently regarded as a key means of yielding 
higher IJV performance.  There are two sets of different MCS used to the control IJVs; 
those exercised internally by IJV management and those exercised by parent partners 
to control the IJV.  The MCS used by parent partners to control their IJVs is of 
particular interest, given that these choices could provide an invaluable tool to align 
venture operations with their individual motives.  Frequently extant literature analyses 
the effectiveness of MCS in isolation (Killing, 1982; Beamish, 1984) without 
considering contingent variables such as motive divergence.  Differences in 
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contingent variables clearly vary from one case to another and therefore conflicting 
findings are frequently found in many studies.   
 
Contributions 
This paper will make a number of important contributions to the understanding 
control and performance of IJVs.  Firstly this paper contributes through providing 
some understanding of factors predictive of successful IJVs.  Geringer and Herbert 
(1991) suggest that factors predictive of successful IJVs are unclear, thus the 
somewhat conflicting findings in extant literature.  However the extant literature fails 
to consider the effect of motive divergence and associated MCS choices on 
performance in an integrated framework.  This paper seeks to address this limitation 
by providing a comprehensive understanding of relevant factors through an 
integrative framework and as a result mitigate the possibility of producing spurious 
findings (Chenhall, 2003). 
Despite the effect of parent partner motive divergence being evident in case 
studies such as Yan and Gray (1994), this variable is rarely incorporated as an 
explanatory factor of IJV performance in confirmatory research.  While Si and Bruton 
(2005) considered the effect of motive divergence on performance in a confirmatory 
study, the investigation is limited however to Chinese IJVs.  The contribution of this 
paper is therefore primarily focused on how the contingent variable of motive 
divergence and associated MCS choices affect IJV performance.  This paper will also 
investigate the impact of motive divergence and related critical resource contribution 
on MCS dimension choices.  In this regard the paper aims to contribute to theory 
development by considering the implications of motive divergence on performance 
and whether the associated MCS mitigate the possible negative performance 
consequences of motive divergence.  The research framework this paper is shown in 
Figure 1. 
The research framework in Figure 1 shows this paper will investigate both the 
effects of motive divergence and the relative critical resource contributions (RCRC) 
made by parent partners on MCS choices, in addition to the relationship between 
these factors.  Subsequently the research framework shows this paper will investigate 
the effect of motive divergence and MCS choices on IJV performance.  
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Figure 1 – Relationships Investigated in Paper 
 
Literature Review and Proposition Development 
 
Given the focus of this paper on IJV performance it is important to choose an 
appropriate method to assess IJV performance.  The instability of IJVs is frequently 
argued to be an indicator of failure.  Studies including Harrigan (1986) and Bamford 
et al. (2004) have found that eventually half of joint ventures originally established 
eventually break up.  This is similar in magnitude to the reported rate of perceived 
unsatisfactory performance by parent partners (Geringer and Herbert, 1991).  
However instability of IJVs can stem from factors which may be positive or negative 
indicators of performance (Reuter, 2000) and therefore is not a clear indicator of IJV 
performance. 
A common method of measuring IJV performance is the use of an overall 
satisfaction measure based on a parent parent’s degree of satisfaction with the 
achievement of objectives concerning their IJV.  While the overall satisfaction 
performance measure is subjectively based and therefore exposed to bias, it has been 
demonstrated by Geringer and Herbert (1991) that the measure closely reflects 
objectively based performance measures.  This approach however still has limitations 
including the fact that parent partners may place too much emphasis on the positive 
aspects of the IJVs and fail to adequately acknowledge negative performance 
(Geringer and Herbert, 1991).  
A comprehensive method of measuring IJV performance based on parent 
partner objectives is to use the Input-Output continuum of joint venture performance 
proposed by Anderson (1990).  Input measures relate to the achievement of 
productivity and learning objectives while output measures relate to the achievement 
of financial objectives including profitability and positive cash flow.  It is suggested 
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that the achievement of these input based objectives in the short run is necessary to 
achieve positive results for output based objectives in the long run.  Difficulties arise 
when attempting to appropriately weight individual performance measures at a given 
time, particularly where partners have multiple objectives for entering an IJV.  A 
possible method of mitigating this issue is to measure performance for individual 
objectives only where they are relevant.  This paper will assess IJV performance from 
the perspective of IJV foreign parent partners based on relevant Input-Output 
continuum objectives. 
The presence of complementary and particularly divergent motives between 
IJV partners is highlighted in extant literature.  At one end continuum complementary 
motives can be defined as those that interlock and guide the operation of joint 
ventures towards the mutual interest of both partners.  The presence of 
complementary motives is indicated by Makhija and Ganesh (1997) where each 
partners’ key motive is to learn from each other.  At the other end are divergent 
motives, where partners pursue dissimilar interests through the joint venture entity, 
resulting in possible conflicting objectives to be achieved by joint venture 
management (Hennart, Kim and Zeng, 1998). 
The extant literature suggests that high levels of motive divergence between 
parent partners leads to lower IJV performance.  This suggestion primarily stems from 
case study findings (Groot and Merchant, 2000; Yan and Gray, 1994; Druckman, 
Singer and Cott, 1997) which provide evidence that relatively complementary motives 
lead to higher performance.  The limitation of case study research is acknowledged by 
Groot and Merchant (2000), who suggest that findings from such research may be 
considered for initial theory development only. 
The use of quantitative data gathered through cross sectional surveys has 
provided further validation of the relationship beyond that of case study based 
research.  However such findings are based solely on IJVs located in China.  In the 
context of Chinese based IJVs, Si and Bruton (2005) indicate that higher levels of 
motive divergence lead to lower performance.  In addition a further limitation of this 
finding is performance is measured from the perspective of the IJV management, 
rather than that of parent partners.  Therefore the extant literature does not provide 
conclusive evidence concerning the relationship between motive divergence and 
performance. 
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Based on the suggestions of the extant literature on the relationship between 
motive divergence and performance, the following proposition will be tested: 
P1: IJVs where parent partners have complementary motives are expected to 
 achieve higher levels of perceived performance compared with IJVs   
 where parent partners have divergent motives. 
 
The extant literature indicates that the level of motive divergence is positively 
related to the relative critical resource contribution made by parent partners to IJVs.  
According to Peng (2000), the institutional environment in developing economies 
compared to advanced industrialised economies is significantly different, and 
therefore strategic differences of firms located in these respective economies is 
expected to be high.  The presence of these differences between developing and 
advanced industrialised economy based partners is argued to be a key driver of 
different partner motives (Si and Bruton, 2005).  These differences are the result of 
different factor endowments of partner firms, often stemming from knowledge based 
resources, critical to both the competitiveness of the IJV and the partner contributing 
such resources.  Often partners are motivated to enter IJVs to learn from a firm 
possessing superior knowledge in a particular area (Demir and Söderman, 2007).  
These partners often view the IJV as a race to learn, with the goal of eventually 
utilising such knowledge to outperform the other partner(s). Therefore extant 
literature suggests that if one partner contributes significantly more critical resources 
to an IJV entity than the other partner, the level of motive divergence could be higher.  
Currently findings in extant literature are focused on Chinese based IJVs (Demir and 
Söderman, 2007; Ding, 1997).  Given that IJVs are a key method of international 
expansion into many countries around the world, this research focus limits the validity 
of the findings to a specific geographical area.  Therefore the following proposition 
will be tested: 
 
P2: Higher relative critical resource contribution to the IJV entity by one 
parent partner will be related to higher levels of motive divergence 
between parent partners. 
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There is considerable debate in extant literature as to the most appropriate 
method of conceptualising the MCS exercised overs IJVs by parent partners. Equity 
share is regarded increasingly as a poor proxy for control, due to the inability of the 
measure to capture the multifaceted nature of MCS (Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; 
Chalos and O’Connor, 2004). 
Geringer and Herbert (1989) suggest that control of IJVs is made up of three 
dimensions; focus, extent, mechanisms of control.  This suggestion appears to provide 
a far more comprehensive method of conceptualising control.  The control dimensions 
are regarded as more comprehensive since they capture the key facets of control rather 
than relying on provide proxies such as equity share. These control dimensions have 
been referred to widely in extant IJV literature and used in relevant research 
(Giacobbe, 2007; Groot and Merchant, 2000; Yan and Gray, 1994; Kamminga and 
Meer-Kooistra, 2006 & 2007).   
These control dimensions are defined as follows: 
● Focus of control:  This dimension refers to the scope of activities and 
decision making areas controlled by a parent of an IJV (Geringer, 1986).  
Parent partners will have a broad focus of control if they exercise control over 
a significant number of operational areas.  In contrast parent partners will have 
a narrow focus of control if they only concentrate on a few key operational 
areas of the IJV, perceived to be critical. 
● Extent of control:  This control dimension is defined as the dominance of a 
partner over decision making processes in joint venture operational areas 
(Geringer and Herbert, 1989).  High extent of control refers to a partner having 
a relatively final and conclusive say in decision making, shared extent of 
control refers to all partners having an active role in decision making with 
neither partner having final decision making power and finally low extent of 
control refers to a parent partner not having a final or conclusive say in 
decision making. 
● There are a number of tools which can be used to exercise control and these 
can be classified as Formal or Social control mechanisms as follows: 
● Formal control mechanisms refer to fixed rules and regulations 
guiding the operation of an IJV and reflect inflexible autocratic 
management (Child, 1973).  These controls are reflective of content-
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orientated mechanisms, referring to the direct intervention of a parent 
partner in the operation of an IJV entity (Bartlett, 1986). Examples of 
formal mechanisms include planning, budgeting and performance 
evaluation procedures, standardised rules and formal authority. 
● Social control mechanisms refer to IJV staff decision making 
autonomy and reporting relationships guiding the operation of an IJV, 
demonstrating more flexible democratic management (Schann, 1983).  
These mechanisms are reflective context-oriented mechanisms, 
referring to those that are culturally and informally based.  Examples 
of such mechanisms include teamwork, socialisation processes and 
regular meetings. 
Extant literature suggests that the control dimensions can be considered in an 
integrated set (Geringer and Herbert, 1989), providing a far more comprehensive way 
of considering control.  Such an integrated set of dimensions for the purpose of this 
paper will be defined on a continuum ranging from ‘Limited’ to ‘Comprehensive’.  
The conceptualisation of an integrated control dimension set will be defined in the 
following paragraph with reference to extant literature.    
According to Geringer and Herbert (1989) and Choi and Beamish (2004) 
exercising effective control entails selective control over areas that a parent perceives 
as critical.  This is based on the notion that there will be critical areas that a parent 
perceives as necessary to the success of the joint venture.  Choosing a relatively broad 
focus will therefore mean that the parent partner is focusing on a large number of 
areas which are perceived as fundamentally important.  The choice of narrow focus by 
one parent partner (i.e. control over a limited set of operational areas) will allow the 
other parent partner(s) significant leeway to control a large number of operational 
areas.  Broad focus by a partner over an IJV is regarded as contributing to 
comprehensive control.  In addition the use of higher extent of control by a given 
partner would contribute to more comprehensive control, due to the dominance over 
joint venture decision making in areas which a parent partner is focusing on (Choi and 
Beamish, 2004).   
In regards to mechanisms of control, formal control mechanisms are used to 
stop or prevent a joint venture entity from engaging in certain actions, and are 
basically formal rules to guide the joint venture operations.  These controls are 
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inflexible and bureaucratic in nature (Child, 1973), leading to comprehensive parental 
control.  In contrast social controls are more democratic in nature and exercised 
through informal mechanisms such as participation in the planning process and 
reporting relationships between staff Schann (1983).  Social control mechanisms can 
be used in the presence and formal controls.  The extensive use of social control 
mechanisms and formal control mechanisms can also be regarded as contributing to 
comprehensive parental control. 
Broad focus, high extent and high level use of formal and social control 
mechanisms by a given partner, can be defined as contributing to comprehensive 
control.  Narrow focus, lower extent and lower use of social and formal control 
mechanisms by a given partner, can be defined as contributing to relatively limited 
control over an IJV, and could reflect the joint control by all partners or dominant 
control by another partner(s).  Therefore a parent partner can exercise the combination 
of individual control dimensions in a continuum ranging from limited to 
comprehensive as shown in Figure 2 below. 














Figure 2 – Integrated Control Set ranging from Limited to Comprehensive
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Extant literature provides limited evidence on the influence of motive 
divergence on MCS choices of IJV parent partners.  Luo et al. (2001) for example 
indicate that greater exposure to local environmental business contingencies in China 
will result in foreign partners seeking to exercise higher levels of control.  It has been 
indicated by Geringer and Herbert (1991) that each partner understands the motives of 
the other partner(s) engaged in an IJV and therefore could be aware of motive 
divergence.  Based on Luo et al. (2001) findings, partners exposed to the effects of 
such a contingency could seek higher levels of control.  This suggests the use of 
comprehensive control choices by a parent partner to mitigate negative effects of 
motive divergence.  Therefore the following propositions will be tested: 
P3A: A parent partner engaged in an IJV with a high level of motive 
divergence with the other parent partner(s) will seek a broader focus of 
control. 
 
P3B: A parent partner engaged in an IJV with a high level of motive 
divergence with the other parent partner(s) will seek high extent of 
control. 
 
P3C: A parent partner engaged in an IJV with a high level of motive 
divergence with the other parent partner(s) will seek high use of formal 
mechanisms of control. 
 
P3D: A parent partner engaged in an IJV with a high level of motive 
divergence with the other parent partner(s) will seek high use of social 
mechanisms of control. 
 
The extant literature suggests that relative critical resource contributions and 
motive divergence are positively correlated (Demir and Söderman, 2007).  Evidence 
found by Yan and Gray (2001) suggests the higher critical resource contribution will 
lead to the exercise of higher extent of control, in order to guard against opportunistic 
behaviour.  In addition findings by Giacobbe (2007) suggest that higher resource 
contributions are associated with more comprehensive control choices.  The greater 
bargaining power of a partner which contributes higher levels of critical resources 
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(Giacobbe, 2007; Nakamura, 2004) reinforces the notion that this partner will exercise 
desired control to guard against opportunistic behaviour.  Therefore it appears that 
partners would exercise comprehensive control over IJV entities to avoid 
opportunistic behaviour by other parent partners.  Therefore the following 
propositions will be tested: 
 
P4A:  A parent partner contributing more critical resources to an IJV than the 
other parent partner(s) will seek a broader focus of control. 
 
P4B:  A parent partner contributing more critical resources to an IJV than the 
other parent partner(s) will seek high extent of control. 
 
P4C:  A parent partner contributing more critical resources to an IJV than the 
other parent partner(s) will seek high use of formal mechanisms of 
control. 
 
P4D:  A parent partner contributing more critical resources to an IJV than the 
other parent partner(s) will seek high use of social mechanisms of 
control. 
 
Extant literature does not provide conclusive evidence on whether more 
comprehensive MCS choices lead to higher levels of performance.  While Killing 
(1982) provides evidence that dominant control leads to higher performance, 
Calantone and Zhao (2000) indicate that use of comprehensive control choices do not 
lead to higher performance.  Further Beamish (1984) shows that comprehensive 
control choices lead to lower performance.  In addition Giacobbe (2007) finds that 
formal control mechanism use is positively related to performance, while focus of 
control is negative related to performance.  There could be a number of reasons for 
these conflicting findings.  Firstly performance is often measured from different 
perspectives, including the management of the IJV itself, or foreign and local 
partners’ perception of performance.  Secondly different control measures or proxies 
are used in extant literature.  While Killing (1982) and Beamish (1984) use the degree 
to which the IJV is managed like a fully owned subsidiary from one partner’s 
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perspective, Calantone and Zhao (2000) use the extent of control and partner equity 
share to proxy for control. 
In addition many studies do not consider effect of contingent factors such as 
motive divergence and relative critical resource contributions on the relationship 
between control and performance.  It may be the case that studies including Calantone 
and Zhao (2000) found comprehensive control had no significant association with 
performance because partner motives were relatively complementary.  In contrast 
where performance was found to be higher using comprehensive controls from the 
foreign partner’s perspective, the motives of the partner could have been relatively 
divergent.  
To reconcile findings in extant literature regarding the relationship between 
control and performance and considering the integrated MCS set, this paper will test 
the following propositions: 
 
P5A:   Broader focus of control by a parent partner will impact on perceived  
 performance of their IJV. 
 
P5B:   Higher extent of control by a parent partner will impact on perceived  
performance of their IJV. 
 
P5C:   The utilisation of formal mechanisms of control by a parent partner 
 will impact on perceived performance of their IJV. 
 
P5D:   The utilisation of social mechanisms of control by a parent partner will 
 impact on perceived performance of their IJV. 
 
By reviewing extant literature this section has considered and developed 
propositions to extend the understanding of whether critical resource contributions 
and motive divergence are related, whether these factors impact on parent partner 
MCS choices and the effect of motive divergence and MCS choices on performance.  
In this regard the propositions developed seek to significantly progress the 
understanding of the cause and effects of motive divergence between IJV parent 
partners.   
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The propositions are placed on the relevant parts of a conceptual theoretical 
model in Figure 3 below.  The model shows that this paper will investigate the effect 
of motive divergence and relative critical resource contributions on the control 
dimensions as indicated by the arrows connecting these variables in accordance to 
proposition set 3 and 4.  The arrow leading from relative critical resource contribution 
to level of motive divergence illustrates that testing of proposition 2 will investigate 
the relationship between these two factors.  Finally the arrows leading from motive 
divergence and control dimensions to performance, demonstrate the testing of 
proposition 1 and proposition set 5 respectively will investigate the relationship 




Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) is used to model the multiple 
relationships between variables shown in Figure 3.  SEM has the ability to model 
multiple relationships between variables and therefore has a distinct advantage over 
multivariate statistical analysis techniques which only analyse one relationship at a 
time (Goldberger, 1973).  There has been an increasing trend towards to use of SEM 
in IJV research due to the move towards explanatory based research (Giacobbe, 2007; 
Yan and Gray, 2001; Calantone and Zhao, 2000).  Given that this paper seeks to yield 
confirmatory based of exploratory based research in extant literature, the use of SEM 
is suitable. 
There are two main approaches to SEM, consisting of covariance and variance 
based techniques including the Partial Least Squares (PLS) technique (Giacobbe, 
2007).  The use of the variance based approach such as the PLS technique is 
appropriate and will be used in this paper given that initial theory is conflicting and 
therefore not particularly strong.  An advantage of using the PLS technique is it can 
be applied to relatively small samples compared with covariance based SEM which 
require a sample size of a least 100 (Haenlein and Kaplan, 2004).  Further, an 
advantage of using SEM approaches in general is the reduction in the impact of 
statistical noise in complex strategic models, an underlying reason why IJV studies 
including Mjoen and Tallman (1997) and Fornell, Lorange and Roos (1990) have used 
the method.  The PLS technique will be carried using PLS-Graph, a statistical 
software program developed by Wynne W. Chin of the University of Houston. 
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Figure 3 – Conceptual Theoretical Model and Propositions 
 
The variables in the conceptual theoretical model are measured by creating 
constructs based on indicators stemming from a cross sectional survey instrument.  In 
PLS a construct is measured by using indicators which can be reflectively or 
formatively based.  Indicators are defined as reflective where the direction causality 
runs from the construct to the indicators and therefore all indicators are expected to be 
correlated to each other (Jarvis, Mackenzie and Podsakoff, 2003).  On the other hand 
where the direction of causality runs from the indicators to the construct and therefore 
indicators are not expected to be correlated they are defined as formative (Jarvis et al., 
2003).   
Measurement of motive divergence between parent partners is of major 
importance given that this paper concentrates on investigating the cause and effects of 
this variable.  Survey participants were asked to scale eleven individual objectives for 
entering into the IJV for both their company (the foreign partner) and their partner 
separately (local partner).  Research by Geringer and Herbert (1991) indicates that 
each partner understands the motives of the other partner(s) when entering into an IJV 
even when partners are culturally dissimilar.  Therefore it is possible to survey one 
joint venture partner and simultaneously gather accurate data on both partners’ 
motives for entering into the joint venture.  A five-point Likert scale extended from 
whether partners strongly agree to strongly disagree on the following objectives:  
1. Profit 
2. Growth 
3. Expansion to related products 
4. Expansion through diversification 
5. Expansion to new market 
6. Cost reduction 
7. Risk sharing 
8. Access resources/raw materials 
9. Knowledge exchange/learning 
10. Co-opting or block competition 
11. Overcoming government barriers 
In order to calculate the level of motive divergence the following steps were 
undertaken in turn: 
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1. Each objective for both local and foreign partners is assigned a motive 
importance value of 1 to 5 based on whether the foreign partner strongly 
disagree to strongly agree respectively that this is an objective. 
2. The absolute difference in partner importance for each of the 11 objectives is 
calculated. 
3. Where a survey participant has indicated corresponding disagreement and/or 
strong disagreement of a particular objective for both partners, these values 
will be excluded from the average calculation carried out in step 5.  This is 
because such objectives are irrelevant to both partners and therefore should not 
be included in the average of the absolute differences.  Including these would 
only result in the level of motive divergence being underestimated. 
4. The average value of the remaining absolute differences is calculated and a 
value of 1 is added.  This is the final Motive Divergence Score ranging from 1 
to 5.  A value of 1 indicates motive alignment or complementary motives.  In 
contrast a motive divergence score of 5 indicates motive divergence.  Since the 
Motive Divergence Score only entails one measure, this will be the sole 
reflective indicator of the Motive Divergence construct.  Treating this indicator 
as reflective is consistent with the assumption underlying PLS analysis. 
 
As indicated in the literature review of this paper the most appropriate method 
to measure IJV performance is through the use of the individual performance 
indicators which survey participants indicate are relevant.  Survey participants 
(foreign based IJV parent partners) were asked to indicate how satisfied they were 
with IJV performance according to individual objective achievement on a Likert scale 
from 1 to 5, where 5 refers to very high satisfaction performance and 1 refers to low 
satisfaction performance.   The individual performance indicators were grouped so to 
create three performance constructs; learning, product and financial performance.  
The indicators for each performance construct were regarded as reflective indicators. 
A second order performance constructs was then estimated to measure the degree of 
satisfaction with the overall performance of the IJV.   
The construct focus of control was estimated by requesting survey participants 
to indicate how many managers they provided to predefined functional areas of the 
IJV in the last five years on a scale of 1 to 5, with high values indicating the 
contribution of more managers to the predefined areas.  Each functional area was used 
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as an indicator of focus of control.  The indicators are reflective given that a parent 
partner’s choice of managers provided in each functional area is consistent with their 
choice of narrow or broad focus of control.        
The construct extent of control was estimated by requesting survey 
participants indicate the relative decision making power of their company over the 
same functional areas of the IJV as for focus of control on a Likert scale of 1 to 5.  
High values indicate greater decision making power over IJV functional areas.  The 
relative decision power over each functional area was used as the indicators for the 
construct of extent.  These indicators are regarded as reflective since it is expected 
that a parent partner’s choice of control over the majority of functional areas will be 
consistent with the choice of low to high extent of control.   
The constructs formal mechanisms and social mechanisms of control were 
estimated through requesting survey participants to indicate the use of the following 
mechanisms in controlling the operations of their IJV: 
a. Contracts 
b. Structural Grouping and Departmentalisation 
c. Formal authority and relationship 
d. Standardised Procedures and Rules 
e. Planning and Budgeting 
f. Supervision 
g. Performance evaluation 
h. Teams & task forces 
i. Meetings & organised personal contact 
j. Transfer of managers/lateral movements 
k. Rituals, traditions and ceremonies 
l. Networking and other socialisation processes 
The first half of these mechanisms (a-g) are regarded as indicators of the formal 
mechanisms construct, and the second half (h-l) are regarded as indicators of the 
social mechanisms construct.  Survey participants were asked to indicate the use of 
these mechanisms on a Likert scale of 1 to 5.  High values indicate greater use of 
control mechanisms.  The indicators of formal mechanisms and social mechanisms 
constructs are regarded as reflective. 
The construct relative critical resources contributions (RCRC) was estimated 
by requesting the survey participant indicate the level of relative resource 
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contributions they make to a set of predefined areas of the IJV on a Likert scale of 1 
to 5.  High values indicate high relative resource contributions.  The indicators of the 
RCRC construct are formative.  This is because partners may have differing resource 
contributions and expertise, and as a result the contribution to one area of the IJV will 
not necessarily be reflective of the contribution to another. 
The data for this paper was collected by using a cross sectional survey 
questionnaire responses.  The survey was mailed out in August 2005 to Australian 
companies involved in equity based IJVs located or operating outside Australia.  The 
sample of survey participants was selected using information from Austrade, 
Connect4 (annual report database) and Dunn & Bradstreet (business data reporting 
company).  A number of sources were necessary as no database of Australian 
companies involved in IJVs was available.  The name of managers in charge of the 
IJV for the Australian partners was obtained in most cases and the survey mail out 
was addressed to this person.  To provide assurance that survey participants 
interpreted the survey questions as intended and therefore ensuring the validity of 




To ensure the validity of the PLS model a number of validity tests were 
performed for both the reflective and formative indicator sets.  Convergent and 
discriminant validity testes were performed for reflective indicators.  The majority of 
rotated factor loading values for each indicator were sufficiently high.  Indicators 
where the rotated factors loading fell below acceptable levels were subsequently not 
used to measure the constructs (Hulland, 1999).  Then Cronbach alphas were 
calculated for constructs estimated by the remaining reflective indicators.  All 
Cronbach alpha values for each construct were higher than 0.7 indicating acceptable 
composite reliability (Nunnaly, 1978).  Given the acceptable rotated factor loadings 
and composite reliability of the reflective indicators and constructs, this indicates 
acceptable convergent validity.  The discriminant validity of constructs was tested by 
calculating the square root of the Average Variance Extracted (AVE).  The square 
roots of all the AVE values are higher than the correlations between the constructs as 
shown in Table 1 below, therefore indicating the constructs have acceptable 
discriminant validity.  These results indicate that it can be concluded that the 
reflectively determined constructs in the PLS model can be reliably used. 
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1.000      
Focus 0.080 0.820     
Extent  -0.035 0.702 0.769    
Formal 
Mechanisms 
-0.012 0.525 0.460 0.749   
Social 
Mechanisms 
-0.107 0.382 0.419 0.562 0.831  
Performance -0.234 0.006 0.114 0.085 -0.051 0.828 
 
Since formative indicators are not expected to be correlated (Jarvis et al., 
2003), the use of validity and reliability testing methods for reflective constructs is not 
appropriate (Chin, 1998).  The validity of a formative construct can be measured by 
the strength of the relationship between formative indicators and the construct (Bollen, 
1989).  The strength of the relationship between formative indicators and the relative 
critical resource contribution construct was determined by calculating the coefficients 
and t-values using the PLS-Graph bootstrap resampling procedure.  The results 
indicate that all formative indicators are highly and significantly related to the RCRC 
construct, confirming the validity of these indicators and construct. 
The PLS results of the model are shown in Table 2 and Figure 4 below.  The 
path coefficient values in Table 2 indicate the estimated effect on the constructs 
shown in bold by the relevant causation constructs.  The R-square values indicate that 
a higher variably in a number of constructs explained by the model, with values 
ranging from 3.5% to 60.5%.  The significance of the relationship between the 
relevant constructs is indicated by the asterisks contained in the final column of Table 
2, which is estimated by comparing the observed t-values with the 2-tailed 







Table 2 – PLS Model Results 






Effects on Motive Divergence 3.5%    
RCRC  -0.187 1.773 * 
     
Effects on Extent of Control 60.5%    
Motive Divergence  0.113 1.789 * 
RCRC  0.791 19.113 *** 
     
Effects on Focus of Control 41.5%    
Motive Divergence  0.201 2.420 ** 
RCRC  0.650 8.533 *** 
     
Effects on Formal Controls 37%    
Motive Divergence  0.104 0.901 ns 
RCRC  0.619 7.948 *** 
     
Effects on Social Controls 27.3%    
Motive Divergence  -0.010 0.102 ns 
RCRC  0.520 5.633 *** 
     
Effects on Performance 10.4%    
Motive Divergence  -0.237 2.048 ** 
Focus of Control  -0.131 0.639 ns 
Extent of Control  0.206 0.888 ns 
Formal Controls  0.175 1.008 ns 
Social Controls  -0.212 1.473 ns 
Significance level 2-tailed: *90%: **95%; ***99% 
2-tailed critical t-values for confidence level: 99%=2.576; 95%=1.960; 90% =1.645 
 
These results reported in Table 2 are summarised in Figure 4 below.  The estimated 
effects and significance of the relationship between the constructs in the model are 
indicated by the coefficient values on the relevant paths.  The variation of each of the 
constructs explained by relevant causation constructs is indicated by the R-square 
values.  
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Figure 4 – PLS Estimates of the Theoretical Framework Model 
2-tailed critical t-values for confidence level: 99%=2.576; 95%=1.960; 90% =1.645 
Significance level 2-tailed: *90%: **95%; ***99% 
 
To investigate the individual effect size of each construct a marginal analysis 
was performed.  The marginal effect size of each construct on the R-square value is 
estimated by the F-square value (Cohen, 1988).  The F-square values are shown in 
Table 3 and 4 below.  The effect size of an exogenous construct on an endogenous 
construct can be interpreted as small if the effect size is 0.02, medium if 0.15 and large 
if 0.35 (Cohen, 1988).   
 
Table 3 – Effect size (F² values) 
 Exogenous Constructs Excluded 
Endogenous Constructs  Motive Divergence RCRC 
 Original 
R² R² F² R² F² 
Focus 0.415 0.377 0.065 0.031 0.656 
Extent 0.605 0.596 0.023 0.009 1.509 
Formal Controls 0.370 0.361 0.014 0.084 0.454 
Social Controls 0.273 0.273 0.000 0.0011 0.360 
Performance 0.104 0.058 0.051 - - 
 
Table 4 – Effect size (F² values) 
 Endogenous Constructs: Performance 
Exogenous Constructs Excluded  
Original R²  0.104 
Focus  
R²  0.102 
F²  0.002 
Extent  
R²  0.099 
F² 0.006 
Formal Mechanisms  
R²  0.083 
F²  0.023 
Social Mechanisms  
R²  0.075 
F²  0.032 
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As shown in Table 2, the path coefficient between Relative Critical Resource 
Contribution on Motive Divergence is -0.187 and is statistically significant at 90% level, 
the R-square value is only 3.5%.  This result indicates that the relationship between the 
two constructs is opposite to the direction suggested in proposition 2.  Therefore no 
support is found for proposition 2. 
The path coefficient between Motive Divergence and Focus of control is 0.201 
and is statistically significant at the 95% level.  This provides support for proposition 
3A, which suggests that higher Motive Divergence is expected to lead to broader Focus.  
The F-square value indicates that the variability of Focus explained by Motive 
Divergence is small to medium.  The results suggest that Relative Critical Resource 
Contribution is highly related to Focus.  A coefficient of 0.650 is generated between 
these constructs which is statistically significant at the 99% level.  In addition the F-
square value indicates that the R-square value of 41.5% for Focus is explained 
primarily by RCRC.  Therefore these results provide support for proposition 4A, which 
suggests that higher RCRC leads to broader Focus. 
The path coefficient between Motive Divergence and Extent is 0.113 and is 
statistically significant at the 90% level.  This provides support for proposition 3B, 
which suggests that higher Motive Divergence leads to higher Extent.  However the 
variability of Extent explained by Motive Divergence is small as indicated by the F-
square value.  The results suggest that Relative Critical Resource Contribution is highly 
related to Extent.  The coefficient of 0.791 between the constructs is statistically 
significant at the 99% level.  In addition the F-square value indicates that the R-square 
value of 60.5% for Extent is explained primarily by RCRC.  Therefore these results 
provide support for proposition 4B, which suggests that higher RCRC leads to higher 
Extent. 
The path coefficient between Motive Divergence and Formal Mechanisms is 
0.104.  Although the coefficient is positive as expected, it is statically insignificant at 
conventional levels.  Therefore this finding provides no support for proposition 3C.  
The results suggest that Relative Critical Resource Contribution is highly related to 
Formal Mechanisms.  The coefficient of 0.619 between the constructs is statistically 
significant at the 99% level.  In addition the F-square value shows that the R-square 
value of 37% for Formal Mechanisms is primarily explained by RCRC.  Therefore 
these results provide support for proposition 4C, which suggests that higher RCRC 
leads to higher use of Formal Mechanisms. 
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The path coefficient between Motive Divergence and Social Mechanisms of 
control is not statistically significant.  Therefore no support for proposition 3D is found.  
Relative Critical Resource Contribution, instead, is highly related to Social 
Mechanisms.  The results show the coefficient of 0.520 is between the constructs is 
statistically significant at the 99% level.  In addition the F-square value shows that the 
R-square value of 27.3% for Social Mechanisms use is explained primarily by RCRC.  
Therefore these results provide support for proposition 4D, which suggests that higher 
RCRC leads to more extensive use of Social Mechanisms of control. 
The coefficient between Motive Divergence and Performance is -0.237 and 
statistically significant at the 95% level.  This result supports proposition 1, which 
suggests that higher Motive Divergence leads to lower Performance.  The variability 
explained by Motive Divergence appears to be small to medium, as indicated by the F-
square value.  The effect of Focus, Extent, Formal Mechanisms and Social Mechanisms 
on Performance is statistically insignificant at all conventional levels.  Therefore no 




The literature review indicates that both motive divergence and relative critical 
resource contributions would have a significant effect on parent partner MCS choices, 
given the presence of opportunistic behaviour stemming from relative critical resource 
contributions.  The results suggest that motive divergence has a significant positive 
relationship with the control dimensions of focus and extent with the magnitude of 
impact being moderate as indicated by the F-square values.  In contrast the results for 
relative critical resource contribution suggest a highly significant and large positive 
effect on all control dimension choices.  This could be explained by the suggestion that 
the level of relative critical resource contribution significantly contributes to the 
bargaining power of a parent partner (Giacobbe, 2007; Nakamura, 2004).  Given this 
suggestion, a parent partner contributing high levels of critical resources to an IJV may 
be in a more powerful position to exercise their desired MCS choices in order to 
mitigate the opportunistic behaviour of another parent partner.  In contrast while a 
parent partner may acknowledge that the presence of high levels of motive divergence 
with another parent partner will have negative implications on the perceived 
performance of the IJV, motive divergence is not defined as a contributor to bargaining 
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power (Giacobbe, 2007; Nakamura, 2004).  Therefore a parent partner may not be in a 
position to seek and implement their desired MCS choices where high levels of motive 
divergence are present.         
This paper conceptualised an integrated approach to considering MCS choices 
on a continuum ranging from ‘Limited’ to ‘Comprehensive’.  The results suggest that 
parent partners do exercise control in an integrated set according to this continuum, 
particularly regarding the effect of relative critical resource contribution on MCS 
choices.  This is suggested by the highly significant and large positive effects that 
relative critical resource contribution has on control dimension choices.  In addition the 
findings regarding the positive and significant effect of motive divergence on focus and 
extent of control, further suggest that considering MCS choices in an integrative 
manner is applicable.  Therefore these findings appear to support the suggestions of 
Geringer and Herbert (1989) regarding the applicability of considering MCS choices in 
an integrated set as suggested by the comprehensive to limited continuum 
conceptualised in this paper. 
The relationship between relative critical resource contribution and motive 
divergence was negative and significant, opposite to what proposition 2 suggests.  This 
finding is in contrast to extant literature that suggests the difference between 
developing and advanced industrialised economy based partners including resource 
endowments is a key driver of motive divergence (Si and Bruton, 2005).  A possible 
explanation of the negative relationship between these two variables is that partners 
contributing high levels of resources to IJVs may also have the power to seek partners 
less likely to be opportunistically motivated.  If a partner contributing high levels of 
critical resources is aware that motive divergence will lead to lower levels of 
performance, this partner could take advantage of their higher bargaining power 
stemming from resource contributions (Giacobbe, 2007; Nakamura, 2004) to enter an 
IJV with partners less likely to opportunistically take advantage of resource contributed.  
Further investigation is therefore warranted to investigate this relationship.   
Central to this paper was the investigation of the effect of motive divergence on 
performance.  The results suggest that motive divergence has a significant negative 
relationship with performance.  This finding is consistent with the case study based 
research of Groot and Merchant (2000) and Yan and Gray (1994).  Given that motive 
divergence has a negative effect on IJV performance this paper investigated whether 
this was limited by parent partner’s MCS choices.  The results however indicate that all 
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control dimensions are not significantly related to performance.  This finding is not a 
surprise given the relatively small effect that motive divergence has on these MCS 




The purpose of this paper was to investigate the cause and effects of motive 
divergence on MCS choices and performance.  This investigation was focused on 
providing confirmatory evidence of suggestions of the exploratory based research 
findings in extant literature by using a PLS statistical analysis.  The results indicate that 
motive divergence is significantly negatively related to performance, however it 
appears that motive divergence has a relatively small impact on the variation in control 
dimension choices.  Contrary to expectations it was found that the contribution of 
higher levels of relative critical resources leads to lower levels of motives divergence 
suggesting that further research is needed to clarify this relationship, extending the 
analysis to other factors of bargaining power (Giacobbe, 2007).  The relative critical 
resource contributions made to an IJV entity by a parent partner were highly 
significantly positively associated with all control dimensions choices.  This suggests 
that the high bargaining possessed by partners contributing high levels of critical 
resources allows them to better exercise desired control.  The results presented in this 
paper make an important contribution to reconciling much of the exploratory based 
extant literature.  In particular by using PLS based structural equation modelling this 
paper has contributed significantly to understanding the cause and subsequent effects of 
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